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ABSTRACT
How to undertake distributional comparisons when personal well-being is
measured using income is well-established. But what if personal well-being
is measured using subjective well-being indicators such as life satisfaction
or self-assessed health status? Has average well-being increased or well-
being inequality decreased?Howdoes thedistributionofwell-being inNew
Zealand compare with that in Australia, or between young and old people
in New Zealand? This paper addresses questions such as these, stimulated
by the increasing weight put on subjective well-being measures by inter-
national agencies such as the OECD and national governments including
New Zealand’s. The paper reviews the methods appropriate for distribu-
tional comparisons in the ordinal data context, comparing themwith those
routinely used for comparisons of income distributions. The methods are
illustrated using data from the World Values Survey.
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1. Introduction
How to undertake distributional comparisons when personal well-being is measured using income is
well-established. But what if personal well-being is measured using subjective well-being indicators
such as life satisfaction or self-assessed health status? Has average well-being increased, and what has
happened to the inequality of well-being? How does the distribution of well-being in New Zealand
compare with that in Australia, or between young and old people and men and women? This paper
reviews and illustrates the methods for addressing questions such as these, stimulated by the increas-
ing weight put on subjective well-being measures by international agencies such as the OECD and
national governments including New Zealand’s.
A catalyst for the new emphasis on subjective well-being was the Report by the Commission on the
Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2009), which set
out a comprehensive agenda for going ‘BeyondGDP’. The Report’s Quality of Life sections emphasize
that ‘well-being is multidimensional’ (2009, p. 14), and that ‘objective and subjective dimensions of
well-being are both important’ (2009, p. 16). The OECD has played an important role in implement-
ing the Report’s recommendations in this area, launching its Better Life Initiative (in 2011), regularly
reporting on well-being outcomes (How’s Life; see e.g. OECD, 2017), and developing the Better life
Index and multiple online resources (see https://www.oecd.org/statistics/better-life-initiative.htm).
In parallel, the national statistical agencies of OECD member countries have also introduced initia-
tives to address the Beyond GDP agenda, including a greater emphasis on collection of and reporting
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on subjective well-being data. For a recent review of initiatives to date, see the symposium on ‘New
measures of well-being: perspectives from statistical offices’ in the March 2015 issue of the Review of
Income and Wealth. Subjective well-being measures continue to be highlighted by high-level groups
taking forward the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi commission’s work: see e.g. Stiglitz, Fitoussi, and Durand
(2018, especially section 3.7).
New Zealand has embraced the Beyond GDP agenda too. New Zealand Treasury began devel-
oping its Living Standards Framework in 2011 and has continued to refine it, drawing heavily on
the OECD’s Better Life approach (New Zealand Treasury, 2018a). Again, the motivation is that
there is ‘more to wellbeing than just a healthy economy’ (New Zealand Treasury, 2018b). New
Zealand Treasury assesses current well-being across twelve domains of people’s lives, ranging from
their civic engagement and governance through to the quality and quantity of their leisure and
recreation time, including income and consumption and also subjective well-being. A Living Stan-
dards Dashboard, consistent with the OECD’s dashboard, summarizes the twelve domains using a
large number of indicators, including life satisfaction and self-assessed health status. For a recent
overview of New Zealand’s situation relative to other OECD countries using this approach, see
OECD (2017). More recently, Statistics New Zealand has been developing a new set of indicators for
measuring social progress. The ‘Indicators Aotearoa New Zealand’ are intended to support various
cross-government initiatives and international reporting, and to align with those in the Treasury’s
Living Standards Framework and the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (Statistics New Zealand,
2019).
These sets of indicators are not only for ex postmonitoring of social progress but also for improving
strategic decision-making in the realms of economic and social policy (Statistics New Zealand, 2018).
The aim is to have an integrated and coordinated approach linking government (setting priorities and
making policy decisions) and the Treasury and Statistics NewZealand (providing analysis and advice,
information and data). This brings us to New Zealand’s first ‘Well-Being Budget’. According to the
Minister of Finance,
[this] is a new approach to how government works, . . . placing the wellbeing of New Zealanders at the heart of
what we do . . . This approach represents a significant departure from the status quo. Budgets have traditionally
focused on a limited set of economic data. Success has been declared on the basis of a narrow range of indica-
tors, like GDP growth. . . . Many countries around the world have begun to look at different ways of measuring
success to better reflect the wellbeing of their people. This Budget goes further and puts wellbeing at the heart
of everything we do. To set the priorities for this Budget, we used evidence and expert advice to tell us where we
could make the greatest difference to the wellbeing of New Zealanders. (Robertson, 2019, p. 3)
In a similar spirit but for the UK, Frijters and Krekel (2019) provide a detailed handbook on how to
design policies to maximize subjective well-being.
The discussion so far demonstrates the substantial role that non-traditional indicators of personal
well-being are now playing in assessments of social progress and the design of socio-economic pol-
icy. However, to date, the dominant approach to summarizing the distribution of well-being in a
given year, and tracking changes over time or differences across groups, has examined distributions
of income, rather than (say) distributions of subjective well-being (e.g. measures of life satisfac-
tion or self-assessed health status). Leading examples of the income-based approach are the annual
reports on Household Incomes from New Zealand’s Ministry of Social Development (Perry, 2018),
the UK’s Households Below Average Incomes (Department for Work and Pensions, 2019), and the
US’s Income and Poverty in the United States (Semega, Kollar, Creamer, & Mohanty, 2019). Since its
landmark report Growing Unequal (2008), the OECD has also provided frequent reports on the dis-
tributions of income within and between member countries, and an income distribution database
(https://www.oecd.org/social/inequality-and-poverty.htm).
Against this background, this paper is based on two observations and a question. First, income is a
cardinal variable, andmany of themost commonly-used indicators of subjectivewell-being, including
life satisfaction and self-assessed health status, are ordinal variables. Second, one cannot undertake
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distributional comparisons for ordinal variables using the same methods as are routinely applied to
cardinal variables. This raises the question: are there analogous methods for ordinal indicators?
I show that the answer is ‘yes’, broadly speaking, and illustrate the methods using data from
the World Values Survey. Before proceeding to address the main question, I elaborate on the first
two observations. Section 2 explains the distinction between cardinal and ordinal variables. Section
3 reviews the standard and well-known methods for undertaking distributional comparisons of
income, a cardinal variable, considering both income levels and inequality. It is analogues of these
that we require for distributional comparisons of ordinal data.
I provide a non-technical review of methods for distributional comparisons of ordinal variables
in Section 4 and, in Section 5, I apply the methods to compare life satisfaction levels and life satisfac-
tion inequality in New Zealand and four other countries (Australia, the United Kingdom, the USA,
and South Africa) in the mid-2000s. I also consider how the distribution of life satisfaction in New
Zealand has developed over time (I compare 1998, 2004, and 2011), and how life satisfaction distribu-
tions in 2004 differ between men and women, and by age group (Section 6). For brevity, I summarize
the findings on these aspects in the main text with the charts summarizing the results available in
Appendices A and B.
2. Cardinal versus ordinal variables (e.g. income versus life satisfaction)
Cardinal variables refer to quantities or amounts. Income is an example of such a variable; so too is
financial wealth, or consumptionmeasured using household expenditure. If we have a distribution of
a cardinal variable for a set of individuals, we can order those individuals according to that variable
from lowest to highest. In addition, differences between values, and ratios of values are well-defined
(which also means that a value of zero is a true zero). It is meaningful to refer to a $100 difference in
income or to say that John’s income is twice as large as Janet’s. Thus, income is measurable on both
an interval and ratio scale.
Ordinal variables encapsulate people’s choices from a set of categories with a well-defined order-
ing. Life satisfaction is a leading example. In the World Values Survey (WVS), respondents are asked
‘All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Using this card on
which 1 means ‘completely dissatisfied’ and 10 means you are ‘completely satisfied’ where would you
put your satisfaction with your life as a whole?’. The card looks like this:
Completely dissatisfied Completely satisfied
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
With a distribution of life satisfaction responses, we can order the individuals in terms of their
response from lowest to highest. However, differences in response values, and their ratios, are not
well-defined. We cannot say that the difference in life satisfaction between 1 and 2 is the same as the
difference between 8 and 9, or that a response of 8 corresponds to four times as great a life satisfaction
as a response of 2, only that a value of 9 is greater than 8 and 2 is greater than 1.
The fundamental measurement issue for ordinal variables is that the labeling of the response cat-
egories is arbitrary. We do not know the underlying life satisfaction scale. The categories could be
relabelled (−5,−4,−3,−2,−1, 0,+1,+2,+3,+4) or (1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14) and there would
be the same information about how a respondent places him- or herself across the 10 categories. There
is no life satisfaction scale counterpart to the ‘dollars per month’ scale used for income; we only know
whether a response is in the third, or fifth, or top category. The same issue arises for all othermeasures
of subjective well-being in which survey respondents are presented with some form of Likert scale.
These include self-assessed health, happiness, and so on.
As we shall see in Section 4, the arbitrariness of scale means that we cannot reliably compare dis-
tributions of life satisfaction (or other ordinal variables) in terms of their means or their inequalities
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summarized using the Gini coefficient – commonly-used for comparisons of income distributions.
Analogous but different tools are required.
An additional issue for distributional comparisons is cross-individual comparability of response
values. That is, in the life satisfaction context and using the WVS scale above, we must assume that a
response of ‘7’, say, corresponds to the same life satisfaction value for all the individuals being com-
pared, whether New Zealanders in 1998 and 2011, New Zealanders or South Africans, or men and
women. This is the assumption of a ‘common reporting function’ and its plausibility may be ques-
tioned (Bond & Lang, 2019). For example, New Zealand and South African respondents may have
different reporting functions because of the substantial differences between their two societies, but the
assumption is more plausible if comparing respondents from a single country to surveys fielded not
too many years apart, or if comparing groups of respondents to a survey in a given year. In this paper,
I assume common reporting functions, following virtually all the literature on subjective well-being.
Readers should also be aware that analogous issues of comparability apply to ‘income’. If we are
interested in ‘personal economic well-being’, the appropriate measure of ‘income’ is not the raw
response from the data source. Researchers and statistical agencies make assumptions about how to:
(i) aggregate income sources across the individuals within an income unit (typically the household or
the family); (ii) adjust observed money incomes for differences in household/family size and compo-
sition ($2000 per month for a single person living alone is worth a lot more in living standards terms
than $2000 for a family of four); and (iii) adjust observed money incomes for differences in price lev-
els across regions with a given country, across years (for temporal comparisons), or across countries
(for cross-national comparisons). In other words, distributional comparisons are based on income
variables that are transformed from the raw data using assumptions about aggregation, equivalence
scales, within-country price differences, inflation rates, and market or purchasing power exchange
rates, and these choices are not simply objective scientific ones but incorporate normative elements.
There are extensive literatures about the sensitivity of income distribution comparisons to different
choices under these headings. In sum, although cross-individual comparability is often cited as an
issue for subjective well-being comparisons, the issue also applies to income comparisons. In the next
section, I assume that appropriate adjustments to observed income values have already been made,
and simply refer to ‘income’.
3. Assessing better-offness: a toolbox of methods for income distributions
The two main distributional features relevant to assessing whether we are better off are well-being
levels and well-being inequality. Better off means having higher well-being levels or less inequality, or
potentially some combination of the two if we are willing to trade-off improvements in one dimension
against deterioration in another. It is helpful to think of assessments being undertaken using a ‘social
welfare function’ that aggregates the information in a distribution of well-being to a single number.
That is, we employ a social welfare functionW = W(x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn) = W(x) and distribution x
is judged better than distribution y ifW(x) > W(y). Individual-level outcomes x and ymay refer to
either income or to a subjective well-being measure.
The income distribution literature has developed twomain approaches to assessing better-offness.
The first consists of ‘dominance’ checks according to which we see whether we can rank two distribu-
tions A and B. The advantage of this strategy is that we may be able to say that A is better than B (A
dominates B) without strong assumptions about the nature of the social welfare function. The weaker
the assumptions, the less likely that there is room for disagreement about the overall assessment. The
downside of relying on dominance checks is that we may not be able to derive a clear-cut ranking.
However, regardless of whether dominance holds, the checks are useful because they involve graphi-
cal comparisons, and these pictures are powerful ways of summarizing the distributions – they ‘show
the data’.
The second approach is to summarize distributions using numerical indices. Indices encapsulate
stronger and specific assumptions about the nature of the social welfare function – about which there
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may be disagreement – but they have the powerful advantage that we can not only rank distributions
(regardless of whether dominance holds), but also talk about magnitudes of difference. (For example,
we are often interested not only in whether inequality increased or decreased but by how much.) Of
course, the two approaches are complementary and analysts often employ both. In addition, it is also
useful to look at density functions as well as cumulative density functions. Although there are no
dominance results associated with the density functions, they are useful tools for ‘showing the data’
in a compact form.
For a more detailed background to the results that I review in the rest of this section, as well as
references to the original literature and additional results, see inter alia Foster, Seth, Lokshin, and
Sajara (2013). For an earlier survey of the same material, see Jenkins (1991).
3.1. Three dominance results andmany indices
There are three main dominance results employed in income distribution analysis. The first is first-
order welfare dominance based on comparisons of cumulative distribution functions (CDFs). We
order the population from poorest to richest in terms of income and calculate each person’s normal-
ized rank (equivalently, cumulative population share), p, and plot p against income. Finding the CDF
for distribution B lying everywhere below the CDF for distribution A is equivalent to B being ranked
better than A according to all social welfare functions that are increasing in each person’s income.
(These functions are individualistic – there are no relative income effects.) The assumption is that
‘more is better’ – there is a social preference for increases in income levels, other things being equal.
(One could go from A to B with a finite sequence of small increments to incomes.) This is a relatively
weak assumption, likely to have widespread support. Observe that nothing has been said about how
much social welfare increases if someone’s income increases; and the result holds regards regardless
of attitudes to inequality.
If this first order dominance holds, then at any specific value of p, quantile xp = F
−1(p) is larger in
B than inA. It is also the case that themean of distributionA is greater than themean of distributionB.
The second result is Lorenz dominance and relates to inequality comparisons. A Lorenz curve
plots cumulative income shares against cumulative population shares (p). The perfect equality ref-
erence point is when the Lorenz curve is a 45° ray through the origin: everyone has the same share
of total income; each person’s income is the mean income. With inequality, the Lorenz curve hangs
below the 45° line: the poorest 20% have less than one fifth of total income and so on. Intuitively,
inequality is greater, the further the Lorenz curve is from the 45° ray. There is also a fundamental
link between mean-preserving progressive transfers of income and inequality reduction. If a small
amount of income is transferred from person R to person P, where R’s income is larger than P’s, and
no other incomes are changed, then the Lorenz curvemustmove inwards towards the perfect equality
reference point over the range of p between P and R.
Atkinson’s (1970) Lorenz dominance result formalizes these ideas: finding the Lorenz curve for
distribution B lying everywhere below the Lorenz curve for distribution A is equivalent to finding
that A has less inequality than B according to all social welfare functions that reflect ‘equality prefer-
ence’ (and ‘more is better’). Equality preference is the idea that amean-preserving progressive income
transfer as described above improves social welfare – though themagnitude of the change is not stated,
thus allowing a wide range of attitudes to be incorporated from almost totally inegalitarian to strongly
egalitarian views. In fact, we can go from the Lorenz dominated distribution to the dominating one
by a finite sequence of mean-preserving progressive transfers. The assumption that ‘more is better’
is maintained but differences in mean income are controlled for: Lorenz curves are based on income
shares rather than income levels.
The third result is Generalized Lorenz dominance and relates to ‘social welfare’ by taking account
of both income levels and income inequality. A Generalized Lorenz curve is derived from a Lorenz
curve by scaling each Lorenz ordinate vertically by overall mean income. Equivalently, the vertical
axis of the Generalized Curve plots against cumulative population share p, the mean income among
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the poorest 100p%multiplied by p. The curvature inherited from the Lorenz curve reflects inequality;
the height reflects income levels (note that the Generalized Lorenz curve value at p = 1 equals mean
income).
Shorrocks’ (1983)Generalized Lorenz dominance result states that finding theGeneralized Lorenz
curve for distribution B lying everywhere below the Generalized Lorenz curve for distribution A is
equivalent to finding that B has less social welfare than A according to all social welfare functions
that reflect ‘more is better’ and ‘equality preference’ – we are concerned about both the overall size of
the economic pie as well as the size of each of the slices going to individuals. The Generalized Lorenz
criterion encapsulates the idea that a society may be better off if a rise in inequality is accompanied
by a sufficiently large increase in income levels. In cases where two Generalized Lorenz curves do
not cross, we can go from the dominated distribution to the dominating one by a sequence of either
mean-preserving progressive transfers or increments to individuals’ income levels or a combination
of both.
If we do not find dominance in a distributional comparison, we cannot order the distributions
without additional assumptions about nature of the social welfare function. Anumerical index reflects
these specifically. Even if two CDFs cross, we can comparemean incomes (the arithmetic mean is one
index of well-being levels; the geometric mean is another). If two Lorenz curves cross, we can assess
inequality by comparing inequality indices. A leading example is the Gini coefficient which is equal
to twice the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect inequality.
The choice of index is a normative issue since different indices aggregate income differences in dif-
ferent ranges of the distribution in different ways. For this reason, economists are particularly fond of
using families of inequality indices in which this sensitivity to differences in income shares in differ-
ent ranges is varied in a systematic way. For example, members of the Atkinson family of inequality
indices are characterized by an ‘inequality aversion’ parameter ε > 0, The larger is ε, the greater
the inequality aversion – the greater is equality preference – and the greater the weight that is put
by the index on income differences at the bottom of the income distribution. Generalized Entropy
indices are the other leading family of inequality indices and are characterized by an income sensi-
tivity parameter α. With α = 0, we have the Mean Logarithmic Deviation; with α = 1, we have the
Theil index, and setting α = 2 yields half the squared coefficient of variation. The smaller (and more
negative) α is, the more ‘bottom sensitive’ the index (corresponding to larger values of ε for Atkinson
indices). The larger α is, the more sensitive is the index to income differences at the top of the income
distribution.
In sum, the income distribution toolbox consists of three sorts of dominance check and associated
graphical device, andmany indices incorporating different social judgements about how to aggregate
incomes and income gaps. These basic tools are used routinely by income distribution researchers.
Not all of the tools are used by statistical agencies but virtually all of the agencies (including the New
Zealand, UK and US ones cited earlier) report estimates or provide access to raw data in a form that
allow other researchers to apply the tools.
4. Assessing better-offness: a toolbox of methods for distributional comparisons of
ordinal variables (e.g. life satisfaction)
The vast majority of users of subjective well-being data treat their well-being variables as cardinal
rather than ordinal. For distributional comparisons, this has a great advantage: one can simply apply
the toolbox described in the previous section. A leading example of current practice is the World
Happiness Report which considers trends over time within countries and cross-national differences
in subjective well-being measured variously in terms of life evaluation (scored using a Cantril lad-
der) and positive and negative affect. Helliwell, Huang, andWang (2019) summarize well-being levels
usingmeans and well-being inequalities using standard deviations. Similarly, a major study of subjec-
tive well-being trends in theUK summarizes trends in four subjective well-beingmeasures in terms of
theirmeans (Bangham, 2019: Figure 11). TheOECD (2017)How’s Life report examines cross-national
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differences in life satisfaction by comparing country means and country inequalities summarized by
S80/S20 indices – the average score of the top 20% of scores divided by the average score of those in
the bottom 20% of scores.
The fundamental problems with using the mean to summarize the distribution of an ordinal vari-
able are that the mean is not a stable reference point and the ranking of a pair of distributions can
change if one changes the scale. The arguments are set out clearly by Allison and Foster (2004). See
also Schröder and Yitzhaki (2017) and Bond and Lang (2019).
For a cardinal variable like income, the mean is a stable reference point but, for ordinal variables,
any transformation of the numerical category labels that preserves their ordering is legitimate. With
these changes in scale, the mean’s location relative to the distribution as a whole or a subset of obser-
vations can vary a lot. Allison and Foster (2004, p. 510) illustrate this problem with reference to a
distribution of 17 responses on a five-category variable represented by (1,3,3,6,4), meaning 1 obser-
vation reporting the lowest category through to 4 observations reporting the fifth (top) category. If the
scale is linear with labels taking integer values from 1 to 5, the distribution has a mean of 3.53, located
between 7th lowest and 8th lowest of the 17 observations. But if the scale is changed so that the label
of the top category is 8 rather than 5, the mean is 4.24, lying between 13th and 14th observations.
Allison and Foster comment that ‘[r]ecalling the categorical nature of the original data, it is difficult
to accept the notion of a central reference value that jumps across observations and values with such
ease’ (2004, p. 510). Moreover, there is no robust answer to questions such as what percentage of
population has above-average SWB?
To illustrate how distributional rankings according to themeanmay change if the scale is changed,
Allison and Foster consider distributions x = (2,2,2,2,2) and y = (3,2,1,1,3). With the same integer
linear scale as before, running from 1 to 5, the means of x and y are 3 and 2.9 respectively. But if the
numerical label attached to the top category is changed to 10, the means of x and y are 4 and 4.4. In
other words, the distributional ordering is reversed. This illustration is not a theoretical curiosum:
Allison and Foster (2004) provide a real-world example using self-assessed health data.
Rankings of distributions of ordinal variables based on comparisons of standard inequality indices
– the commonly-used ones cited in the previous section – are also not robust to changes of scale. This
is because all the indices are based on ratios of each observation’s well-being score to the mean score
(this is why they are sometimes called ‘relative’ indices). The OECD’s S80/S20 index is also not robust
for the same reason. The same problem rules out comparisons based on Lorenz and Generalized
Lorenz curves.
The standard deviation of subjective well-being scores is often used as an inequalitymeasure (as by
theWorld Happiness Report op. cit.). Inequality orderings based on this measure, and other ‘absolute’
indices such as the absolute Gini coefficient or inter-quartile range, are robust to absolute changes in
scale, e.g. if the five-category linear scale cited earlier with labels running from 1 to 5 were changed
to a scale running from 3 to 7. However, there is no reason to support the legitimacy of this sort of
scale change and rule out other transformations – an issue not considered by Kalmijn and Veenhoven
(2005) in their defence of the standard deviation as an inequality measure for ordinal variables.
The arguments made so far imply that distributional comparisons of ordinal variables need new
tools; the toolbox for cardinal variables should not be applied without adaption or modification.
4.1. Dominance results and indices
For dominance results relating to subjective well-being levels, comparisons of CDFs continue to play
a role, though they now refer to CDFs for discrete distributions (and hence step functions) rather
than continuous distributions. Although comparisons of mean subjective well-being are not robust
to scale changes, comparisons of quantiles are. The category that is the median, for instance, remains
the median if the scale is changed. One can also compare proportions with responses in a number of
categories, for instance in the lowest category or the top two categories (this corresponds to looking
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at the inverse of the CDF). For example, the UK’s Office for National Statistics (2018) report on sub-
jective well-being summarizes trends in distributions over time with reference to the proportion of
persons with low well-being (scores of 0–4 on an 11-point integer scale running from 0 to 10), and
the proportion with very high well-being (scores of 9 or 10).
The robustness of a distributional ordering by the mean holds only in the special case in which
two well-being CDFs do not cross. Allison and Foster (2004, Theorem 1) show that finding the CDF
for distribution B lying everywhere below the CDF for distributionA is equivalent to B having higher
mean well-being than A for all possible scales applied to the categories. In the language of Dutta and
Foster (2013) distribution B ‘F-dominates’ distribution A. This result does not tell us which scale
of the infinite possible scales should be used to calculate and compare mean well-being, only that
robustness to scale exists. For numerical comparisons of well-being levels, comparisons should be
based on quantiles or category proportions.
Note that the Allison-Foster theorem, and other results cited in this section, refer to dominance
for a categorical well-being variable (with an arbitrary scale). They do not refer to dominance for an
underlying unobserved subjective well-being variable – it is often assumed that the discrete categori-
cal responses aremanifestations of a latent continuous variable. Bond and Lang (2019) emphasize this
point, highlighting the strong assumptions required to identify the distribution of the latent variable.
In the conventional Lorenz-based approach to inequality, ‘more unequal’ is associated with a
greater spread around the mean. This concept is inappropriate for ordinal data because the mean
is scale-dependent. In contrast, the median is a natural reference point because its relative position is
invariant to the choice of scale. Hence most research by economists has characterized ‘more unequal’
for ordinal variables as meaning greater dispersion around the median. The perfect equality bench-
mark is when all responses fall in the same category (which need not be the median). The perfect
inequality benchmark from this perspective is when half the responses fall in the lowest category and
half the responses fall in the top category. Strictly speaking this is a situation of maximum polariza-
tion rather than maximum inequality in the sense of maximal spread across categories, a distinction
to which I return below.
Allison and Foster (2004) and Dutta and Foster (2013) discuss how a concept of ‘S-dominance’
(‘S’ for spread) encapsulates the idea of greater spread around themedian. They show that distribution
A has greater spread away from the median than distribution B (B S-dominates A) if and only if the
following three conditions hold: (i)A and B have the samemedian; (ii) for every category k below the
median category, the cumulative population share in the lowest k categories of A is no smaller than
the cumulative population share in the lowest k categories of B; and (iii) for all categories at and above
themedian category, the cumulative population share in the lowest k categories ofA is no greater than
the cumulative population share in the lowest k categories of B. In terms of CDFs, the CDF for A is
above (or nowhere below) the CDF for B up to the common median, and then is below (or nowhere
above) the CDF for B above the median through to the top category. Allison and Foster (2004) show
how one can construct an ‘S-curve’ from the CDF in order to implement dominance checks but, in
practice, it is straightforward to compare CDFs to check S-dominance. If there is S-dominance, the
CDFs for A and B must cross each other (once), and so, if there is F-dominance, there cannot be
S-dominance as well.
The ‘greater spread around the median’ idea leads naturally to numerical indices summarizing
the degree of inequality (polarization). Allison and Foster (2004), and later Dutta and Foster (2013),
propose a measure based on areas under an S-curve. Specifically, the AF index is the difference
between themean response for above-median categories minus themean response for below-median
categories. Although it has an intuitive interpretation, AF is scale-dependent.
Scale-independent indices have been developed by Abdul Naga and Yalcin (2008), based on the
weighted difference between the proportion of individuals in above-median categories and the pro-
portion in below-median categories. Everymember of theANY(α,β) family of indices takes on values
between 0 (the case of equality) and 1 (total polarization), where α, β ≥ 1. The parameters determine
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the weights that are given to the top and bottom halves of the distribution in the aggregation of differ-
ences from the median. Relatively more weight is given to the bottom the more that β is greater than
α, and relatively more weight is given to the top the more that α is greater than β . Thus, by analogy
with the Generalized Entropy family of inequality indices, the ANY(α, β) family may have bottom-
and top-sensitivemembers. For the case of a linear integer scale (1, 2, 3, . . . ), theANY(1, 1) index can
be interpreted as an Average Jump index – the average number of category ‘jumps’ required to change
from the observed level to the median level, normalized by the total number of categories. For this
scale, ANY(1, 1) is also equal to the Allison-Foster index divided by the total number of categories
minus one (Allison & Foster, 2004, p. 514).
Other families of inequality/polarization indices have been proposed by, for example, Apouey
(2007), whose measures summarize ‘distances’ between the CDF and one half (the CDF value at the
median) across the categories of thewell-being variable. The greater the aggregate distance, the greater
the spread around the median, with different distance concepts leading to different indices. Apouey’s
P2(0.5) and P2(2) indices incorporate ‘square root’ and Euclidean distance, respectively. P2(2) is the
1 – l2 index of Blair and Lacy (2000). P2(1) is the Average Jump index. In the empirical analysis that
follows, I estimate P2(0.5) and P2(2) in addition to ANY(1,1), ANY(1,2), and ANY(1,4) indices.
A totally different approach to measuring inequality in ordinal variables is taken by Cowell and
Flachaire (2017). They argue in favor of amulti-step approach to the derivation of an inequality index.
First, one decides how to summarize each individual’s ‘status’ given the responses on the ordinal
variable. Second, overall inequality is an aggregate summary of the ‘distances’ between each person’s
status and an appropriate reference status value. One of the advantages of their general approach
is that it incorporates the conventional approach to inequality measurement for cardinal variables
as well. Cowell and Flachaire consider several status measures but focus on the definition labeled
‘peer-inclusive downward-looking’ status: each person responding with category k is attributed with
a status equal to the value of the empirical CDF for category k, with all persons in the same category
having the same status. An important property of this status measure (and Cowell’s and Flachaire’s
other peer-exclusive and upward-looking status measures) is that they are scale-independent. The
next definitional step is to specify the reference status value. Cowell and Flachaire argue persuasively
that, for the case of a peer-inclusive statusmeasure, this reference point should be themaximum status
value (which is one, given that status is defined in terms of CDF values). The final step in building the
inequality index is to aggregate the individual differences between observed and maximum status.
The result is a one-parameter family of inequality indices, CF(γ ), with 0 ≤ γ < 1. The smaller
that γ is – the closer to zero – the greater the weight that is put on small status values relative to high
status values in the aggregation or, put differently, greater weight is put on status values that are a
large distance from the reference point value of 1 rather than a small distance. In common with the
median-based indices, the minimum value of CF(γ ) indices, zero, arises when all individuals are in
the same category. The maximum value of a CF(γ ) index cannot be determined a priori, but one can
show that the index value is greater for a uniform distribution (respondents spread evenly across all
of the categories) than for a totally polarized distribution (Jenkins, 2019).
Jenkins (2019) reports a dominance check relating to CF(γ ) inequality indices based on compar-
isons of Generalized Lorenz curves for the distributions of status (as defined above). If all individuals
report the same category and so have the same status (one), the Generalized Lorenz curve is a 45° ray
through the origin and (1, 1). If there is inequality, the Generalized Lorenz curve hangs below this
reference line with a vertical intercept at p = 1 that is less than one. Drawing on Shorrocks (1983),
Jenkins shows that finding the Generalized Lorenz curve for status distribution A everywhere below
the Generalized Lorenz curve for status distribution B is equivalent to CFA(γ ) > CFB(γ ) for all
possible values of γ .
A fresh look at dominance results for ordinal variables is taken by Gravel, Magdalou, and Moyes
(2015) using the concept of a Hammond transfer. A progressive Hammond transfer is one in which
there is a small shift in the frequency density mass downwards from some higher category combined
with a small shift in frequency density mass upwards from some lower category, where the ‘recipient’
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category in the former is less than or the same as the ‘recipient’ category in the latter. This is analogous
to the mean-preserving progressive transfer concept cited earlier for income except that it does not
specify the ‘amount’ transferred – this is inappropriate where ordinal variables are concerned. Gravel
et al. (2015) derive a social welfare dominance result analogous to Generalized Lorenz dominance
for income: they show that (i) a ranking of distribution A above distribution B according to all social
welfare functions that are a scale-weighted sumof category proportionswhere theweights are strongly
concave is equivalent to (ii) being able to go fromB toAwith a combination of progressiveHammond
transfers or increments in frequency density mass (a shift of a person from one category to the next
highest category). And (i) and (ii) are equivalent to (iii) ‘H+ dominance’ of A over B, which is a set of
restrictions on the configurations of the CDFs for the two distributions (see their paper for details).
Although the conditions defining H+ dominance are complicated, they are relatively easy to check
in practice. Gravel et al. (2015) also prove a second dominance result related to an ‘H− dominance’
condition on CDFs which is equivalent to a sequence of Hammond transfers and/or decrements.
By analogy with results showing that the Lorenz dominance criterion for income is equivalent to
the simultaneous satisfaction of Generalized Lorenz dominance (known as ‘supermajorization’ in the
mathematics literature) and a related concept (‘submajorization’), Gravel et al. argue that the ‘rank-
ing of distributions generated by the intersection of the two domination criteria H+ and H− could
serve as a plausible instance of a clear inequality reduction in an ordinal setting. Indeed, . . . , any
finite sequence of Hammond transfers would be recorded as an improvement by this intersection
ranking’ (2015, p. 6). A formal proof of the equivalence between pure inequality reduction (relating
to sequences of Hammond transfers alone) and the intersection ranking is provided in the Novem-
ber 2019 revision of their paper. I therefore report H− dominance checks below in addition to H+
dominance checks.
An advantage of the Gravel et al. (2015) approach to ordinal distributional comparisons is that
the dominance checks are not restricted to distributions with a common median as is the case for
Allison and Foster’s (2004) S-dominance criterion. This is also true for aCF(γ ) dominance check but
the relationship between this and Gravel et al.’s (2015) dual-H dominance is yet to be ascertained.
Observe, finally, thatH+ dominance is a form of second-order stochastic dominance and so, if there
is F-dominance, there must also be H+ dominance.
In sum, I have shown that there is a toolbox for distributional comparisons of ordinal variables
that is analogous to the more widely-known and commonly-used toolbox for income distribution
comparisons. Both toolboxes consist of dominance checks and associated graphical devices, and also
indices incorporating different social judgements about to weight low values relative to high values
of the well-being variable. The next Section illustrates the toolbox in action.
5. Comparisons of life satisfaction distributions: New Zealand and Australia, the UK,
the USA, and South Africa
My empirical analysis is based on data from theWorld Values Survey (WVS), documented by Ingle-
hart et al. (2014). I wish to focus on New Zealand in this paper and the WVS is the only accessible
source with unit record data on subjective well-being variables for New Zealand. Unfortunately – and
unnecessarily – access to confidential unit record files from other New Zealand data sources on sub-
jective well-being is currently restricted to residents with access to a Statistics New Zealand-approved
datalab.
The WVS consists of nationally representative surveys in almost 100 countries using a common
questionnaire that includes questions on a range of subjective well-being variables. TheWVS collects
data from one adult (individual aged 18+ years) per household. Six WVS survey rounds have been
conducted to date but New Zealand participated only in 1998 (wave 3), 2004 (wave 5), and 2011
(wave 6).
The focus here is on comparisons of WVS wave 5 life satisfaction distributions for New Zealand
(NZ; 954 respondents), Australia (AU; 1,421), Great Britain (GB; 1,041), the United States of America
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(US; 1,249), and South Africa (ZA; 2,988). The distributions refer to responses to the 10-category life
satisfaction question set out in the Introduction. All the estimates I report are based on weighted data
using the weights supplied with the WVS.
I restrict attention to only four countries besides New Zealand for the sake of brevity and focus.
The countries chosen are all English-speaking; four are former British colonies; and four are close
rivals in many sports. South Africa is a middle-income country in the Global South, whereas the
other four countries are relatively rich (OECD member countries; in the Global North).
Country differences in income distribution provide a reference point for comparisons of life sat-
isfaction distributions. It is clear from Table 1 that South Africa stands out from the other four
countries, with an average income measured using real GDP per capita very much lower than the
other four countries (about one third that of New Zealand’s) and with substantially greater income
inequality (about twice as large as New Zealand’s according to the Gini coefficient). The USA also
stands out, though to a lesser degree, because of its relatively high average income and second-ranked
inequality level. The rest of this section considers whether these cross-national differences in income
distribution are mirrored in the cross-national differences in life satisfaction. For example, are New
Zealanders better off in life satisfaction terms than South Africans or Australians?
Figure 1 shows the proportions of individuals in each of the ten life satisfaction categories, country
by country. Australia, Britain, and theUSA appear to have similarly-shaped distributionswith relative
frequencies rising toward the modal value (8) and then decreasing thereafter. The mode is also 8 for
New Zealand and South Africa, but these two countries stand out for the relatively high fractions of
individuals reporting that they are ‘completely satisfied’ (score of 10): 22.0% and 17.5% respectively,
by contrast with 10.9% for Britain, 8.2% for Australia, and only 6.7% for the USA. South Africa is also
distinctive for having relatively high fractions of individuals reporting very low life satisfaction, with
almost 6% in the lowest two categories, whereas the fraction is less than half that for the other four
countries (highest for Australia at 2.6%). The country means are, given the 1–10 scale, 7.9 (NZ), 7.3
(AU), 7.6 (GB), 7.3 (US), and 7.0 (ZA).All the pairwise differences inmeans are statistically significant
with the exception of the AU-US comparison. The median is 8 for all countries except South Africa
for which it is 7. Thus, a first look suggests that life satisfaction levels and inequality rankings across
the countries broadly correspond with those reported for income in Table 1. But to what extent are
the rankings robust to scale and the use of methods appropriate for ordinal data?
Figure 2 presents pair-wise comparisons of the life satisfaction CDF for New Zealand with each
of the other four countries. The horizontal dashed lines at 0.5 identify the median category. New
Zealand’s CDF lies everywhere on or below the CDF for Australia, the USA, and South Africa, i.e. the
life satisfaction distribution for New Zealand F-dominates that for these three countries. (The largest
differences are in the top life satisfaction categories, as expected fromFigure 1.)Hence, we can say that
average life satisfaction is higher for New Zealand than for any of those three countries, regardless of
the life satisfaction scale. There is only one other F-dominance result: Britain F-dominates Australia
(graph not shown). In every other pair-wise comparison, the CDFs cross.
Table 1. Income distribution summary: AU, GB, NZ, US, ZA.
Country (Acronym)
Relative GDP
per capita (%)
Gini coefficient
(%)
Australia (AU) 122 31.5
Great Britain (GB) 116 34.6
New Zealand (NZ) 100 33.5
USA (US) 155 38.5
South Africa (ZA) 34 65.7
Notes: GDP per capita is in 2011 PPP international dollars in 2005, expressed
relative to NZ’s value (source: World Bank Development Indicators online
database). Gini coefficient refers to distributions of equivalized net household
income amongpersons for AU in 2004, GB in 2005, NZ in 2005, US in 2006, and
ZA in 2008 (source: UNU-WIDER’s WIID4 database).
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Figure 1. The distribution of life satisfaction in 5 countries, mid-2000s.
Notes: Weighted estimates fromWVS data. The country means are: 7.9 (NZ), 7.3 (AU), 7.6 (GB), 7.3 (US), and 7.0 (ZA). The median is
8 for all countries except ZA (7).
Figure 2. Cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for life satisfaction.
Notes: Weighted estimates fromWVS data. Country A F-dominates country B if the CDF for A lies everywhere on or below that for B
(see main text). p is the cumulative proportion of individuals ordered from lowest to highest life satisfaction.
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What about life satisfaction polarization and inequality dominance? There is no pair-wise coun-
try comparison that yields an S-dominance result. There are three reasons for this. First, the criterion
is inapplicable when the two countries have different medians, as with any comparison involving
SouthAfrica. Second,where there isF-dominance, as in four pair-wise comparisons, there cannot also
be S-dominance. Third, in the remaining comparisons, the configurations of CDFs are inconsistent
with S-dominance. Thus, the minimal assumptions about the social welfare function that under-
lie the S-dominance criterion are insufficient to order the countries in terms of median-referenced
inequality/polarisation. But what if the common-median requirement is removed?
Figure 3 shows the results of CF(γ ) inequality index dominance checks for New Zealand with
each of the other four countries. New Zealand’s Generalized Lorenz curve for life satisfaction status
lies everywhere on or above that for South Africa, so New Zealand’s life satisfaction distribution is
more equally distributed than South Africa’s according to all members of theCF(γ ) family of indices.
However, Britain’s Generalized Lorenz curve lies everywhere on or above New Zealand’s, so New
Zealand’s distribution is more unequal than Britain’s according to this set of indices. However, the
curves for New Zealand and Australia, and New Zealand and US cross, and so there is no dominance
in these cases: whether New Zealand has greater or lower inequality according to a CF(γ ) index
Figure 3. Checks for dominance according to all CF(γ ) inequality indices using Generalized Lorenz curve comparisons of life satis-
faction ‘status’ distributions.
Notes: Weighted estimates from WVS data. The figure shows Generalized Lorenz curves for life satisfaction ‘status’, where status is
defined using Cowell and Flachaire’s peer-inclusive downward-looking definition (seemain text). If the Generalized Curve for Coun-
try A lies everywhere on or below that for B, life satisfaction inequality is greater in A than B, for all members of the CF(γ ) family
of inequality indices (see main text). p is the cumulative proportion of individuals ordered from lowest to highest life satisfaction
status.
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can depend on the value of γ that is used. Generalized Lorenz curves for comparisons of the USA
with Britain, and the USA with Australia also cross (graph not shown). However, checks show that
Britain is more equal than Australia (graph not shown). Moreover, and consistent with the discussion
of frequency distributions earlier, the checks show that South Africa’s life satisfaction distribution
is more unequal than that for each of the other four countries (graphs not shown). The differences
between the curves are quite small, however, suggesting that some cross-national differences may not
be statistically significant – an issue I return to below.
Figure 4 shows pairwise comparisons of H+ curves (left) and H− curves (right) for New Zealand
and each of the other four countries. Recall that New Zealand F-dominates each of Australia, the
USA, and South Africa (Figure 2) and therefore we also see that New ZealandH+ dominates each of
these countries. New Zealand’s curve lies everywhere on or below that for these three. However, New
Zealand’s H+ curve lies everywhere on or above that for Britain. Although there was no first-order
dominance (F-dominance), Britain’s distribution second-order dominates New Zealand’s. Again the
relatively small differences between the pairs of curves compares warns us that differences may not
be statistically significant.
For ‘pure’ inequality dominance according to Gravel et al.’s (2015) results, we require the dual
dominance criterion to hold, i.e. to have bothH− andH+ dominance. In Figure 3, the only compari-
son for which this occurs is for New Zealand and Britain. Thus, the distribution of life satisfaction in
Britain is more equal than the distribution in New Zealand according to the dual dominance cri-
terion as well as according to the CF(γ ) dominance criterion. South Africa’s distribution is also
more unequal than the distributions for each of Australia, Britain, and the USA, according to both
Figure 4. Checks for life satisfaction H+ dominance (left) and H– dominance (right).
Notes: Weighted estimates from WVS data. The figure shows H+ curves (left) and H– curves (right) If the H+ curve for Country A
lies everywhere on or below that for B, A H+-dominates B meaning social welfare is higher; and analogously for non-crossing H–
curves (seemain text). Gravel et al.’s (2015) result is that if bothH+- andH–-dominance hold (dual dominance), there is also equality
dominance (see main text).
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criteria (H curves not shown). However, the dual dominance criterion is not satisfied for the NZ-
ZA comparison (or, indeed, for any other pairwise comparison of countries not mentioned so far).
New Zealand’s distribution clearly H+ dominates (and F-dominates) South Africa’s, but there is no
H− dominance, a result essentially due to the relatively high proportions of individuals in the very
top life satisfaction categories in both these countries (Figure 2).
In sum, the two types of inequality dominance check yield only one consistent result – that Britain’s
life satisfaction distribution is more equal than South Africa’s. According to the CF dominance
checks, Britain’s distribution is more equal than New Zealand’s and Australia’s and the distribution
for each of these two countries is in turnmore equal than South Africa’s. Thus, in order to completely
order the five countries in terms of life satisfaction inequality, we have to use indices, in the knowledge
that different indices may provide different orderings.
Figure 5 shows estimates of inequality indices for each of the five countries together with their
associated 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors based on a repeated half-sample boot-
strapping method that handles sampling weights correctly (see Van Kerm 2013 for details of the
implementation). There are nine indices: three CF(γ ) with γ chosen to cover the range of possi-
ble values; three ANY(α, β) indices with the parameters chosen so there is variation in the extent
to which the indices are ‘bottom sensitive’; two Apouey indices incorporating different concepts of
‘distance’ of the CDF from the median; plus, for reference, the commonly-used standard deviation
measure which treats the data as if they are cardinal rather than ordinal.
Figure 3 shows that life satisfaction inequality is greater in South Africa than in each of the other
four countries, regardless of which index is chosen. Also, Britain is the country with the most equal
distribution. However, the magnitudes of the differences depend on the index chosen. For exam-
ple, according to CF(0), inequality is 9% higher in South Africa than in Britain and 4% higher than
in New Zealand. However, if the ANY(1,1) index is used, the corresponding differences are 67%
Figure 5. Indices of life satisfaction inequality and polarization.
Notes: Weighted estimates fromWVS data. The figure shows point estimates of inequality and polarization indices and their associ-
ated 95% confidence intervals (derived using bootstrap standard errors; 500 replications using appropriate bootstrap weights).
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and 40%. For the standard deviation (scale dependent), the differences are in between: 49% and
29% respectively. In part, these differences in magnitude arise because the three indices cited incor-
porate different conceptualizations of ‘inequality’, i.e. deviation of values from different reference
points – the maximum, the median, and the mean. Differences also arise because of the different
ways that indices weight distances from the relevant reference point. For example, ANY(1,4) is more
sensitive to differences below the median than ANY(1,1). According to the former, life satisfaction
inequality is 41% higher in South Africa than in New Zealand and 35% higher than in Britain. These
cross-country differentials are slightly smaller than the corresponding ones for ANY(1,1). Going
from ANY(1,1) to ANY(1,4) makes more of a difference when summarizing how much greater New
Zealand’s inequality is than Australia’s: for the former index, the ratio of country estimates is 1.06;
for the latter, it is 1.17. (Look at Figure 5 to see this too.)
Changing the index may also change the ordering of the countries in terms of life satisfaction
inequality. Figure 5 shows, and as we would expect from the dominance analysis, the differences
in country rankings largely refer to the ordering of Australia and the USA relative to each other.
For seven of the indices, inequality is very slightly greater in the USA; for P2(2) and the standard
deviation, US inequality is slightly lower than Australia’s.
However, the confidence intervals shown in Figure 5 remind us to be cautious about making infer-
ences about cross-national differences. For example, the null hypothesis that inequality is the same
in Australia and the USA cannot be rejected for CF(0) (test t-statistic 0.37, which is very much less
than a critical value of 2), P2(2) (t-statistic 0.98), or the standard deviation (t-statistic 1.55). On the
other hand, the differences between South Africa and each of the other four countries are statistically
significant. This is not only because estimated inequality is so large for South Africa, but also because
the sample size for that country is much larger than for the others and so estimates are more precise
(confidence intervals narrower). For example, the null hypothesis that life satisfaction inequality is
the same inNewZealand and SouthAfrica is decisively rejected. The test t-statistics are: 5.1 forCF(0),
9.9 for ANY(1,1), 4.9 for ANY(1,4), and 9.2 for P2(2), for instance.
In sum, there is one clear similarity between the differences in the distributions of life satisfaction
and of income across the five countries: for both measures of well-being, South Africa has the lowest
average well-being and the highest inequality. Otherwise, however, rankings of the other four coun-
tries are not the same. For example, by contrast with the rankings shown in Table 1, it is not the USA
that has the highest average life satisfaction or the second-highest level of life satisfaction inequality.
And, compared with the USA, New Zealand has higher levels of average life satisfaction and higher
life satisfaction inequality.
6. Life satisfaction in New Zealand: trends over time and differences across groups
The toolbox of methods for ordinal data illustrated in Section 5 can also be applied to other types
of comparisons. One can address questions such as whether the distribution of life satisfaction has
improved over time and how life satisfaction distributions differ between groups within a given pop-
ulation. Differences by sex and by age are common indicators of stratification in a society. Differences
by ethnic background are also important but they cannot be examined using these WVS data.
Using WVS data, I have compared life satisfaction distributions in New Zealand for 1998, 2004,
and 2011 (unweighted sample sizes: 1,201, 954, and 841, respectively). In addition, for 2004, I have
compared life satisfaction betweenmen andwomen (unweighted sample sizes 513, 420), and between
three age groups defined as individuals aged 18–29 years, 30–59 years, and 60+ years (unweighted
sample sizes 111, 560, and 257).
For brevity, all the charts summarizing the comparisons undertaken – in the same formats as those
discussed in Section 5 – are reported in two Appendices (A for trends over time; B for differences
across groups). In this section, I simply highlight themain findings without citing the charts onwhich
they are based.
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6.1. Trends over time: life satisfaction in 1998, 2004, and 2011
The main issue of interest here is whether New Zealanders have got better off in successive periods.
In terms of the metrics discussed so far, we are interested in what happened to life satisfaction levels,
inequality, and their combination (‘social welfare’). The frequency distribution changed a little over
time: although the median response is 8 for 1998, 2004, 2011, the means are 7.7, 7.9, and 7.6, respec-
tively. The higher mean for 2004 largely reflects a small increase in relative frequencies in the very top
category. Pairwise comparisons of CDFs reveal that 2004 F-dominates 1998 and also F-dominates
2011, but the CDFs for 1998 and 2011 cross. It seems that, regardless of the scale used, average life
satisfaction levels rose and then fell back.
What about life satisfaction inequality trends? There are no S-dominance results and so no
dominance results are available for median-based inequality indices. According to comparisons of
Generalized Lorenz curves for life satisfaction ‘status’, 2011 is more equal than 1998, and 2004 is also
more equal than 1998 according to all CF(γ ) indices. However, the differences between the curves
are very small and hence likely to be not statistically significant.
Given the F-dominance results cited above, it must also be the case that 2004H+-dominates 1998
and also that 2004 H+-dominates 2011. But Gravel et al.’s (2015) inequality dominance result also
requiresH− dominance to hold and it does not for these two pairs of years. The only dual-dominance
result is that 2011 is more equal than 1998. This is consistent with the Generalized Lorenz dominance
result for CF(γ ) indices for that pair of years. However, the differences between the relevantH curves
are very small once again.
Estimates of the nine equality indices used earlier confirm that inequality is lower in 2011 than
1998, though the estimated decrease over time depends on which specific index is used. For example,
according to CF(0) the decrease is less than 1% (from 0.794–0.792). The decrease registered by P2(2)
is one of the largest but, at around 5%, is still small. Inequality in 2004 is estimated to be lower than
in 1998 according to all nine indices, but whether it is larger or smaller than 2011 depends on which
index is employed. For six indices, 2004 has lower inequality but, for the two bottom-sensitive indices
ANY(1,2) andANY(1,4) and also P2(0.5), inequality is higher. Again, the changes over time are small
and none of the pairwise differences between years is statistically significant.
Overall, the data suggest that there was both a fall in average life satisfaction and in inequality
between 1998 and 2011. These changes contrast with the rise inmean andmedian equivalized house-
hold income over the same period and relatively unchanged income inequality for the same period
that are reported by Perry (2018). However, one cannot state with confidence that the changes in the
distribution of life satisfaction are statistically significant.
6.2. Differences across groups: life satisfaction in 2004, by sex and by age group
Although differences by sex and by age are of great interest, it is difficult to draw robust conclusions
about life satisfaction differences usingWVS data. As before, the issue is one of statistical rather than
substantive significance. This is particularly pertinent when looking at subgroup differences because
WVS sample sizes for subgroups are small, especially for the age breakdowns. Indeed, breakdowns by
sex and age combined, or other interesting combinations of characteristics, all of which lead to even
smaller sample sizes, are largely worthless.
The frequency distributions for men and women look different. Although the medians are the
same (8) and the means very similar (7.92 and 7.87 respectively), the spread across the top four cat-
egories differs: in particular, relatively more women than men report 10 rather than 9. Comparisons
of CDFs reveal neither F- nor S-dominance. The Generalized Lorenz curve for women’s life satisfac-
tion status lies everywhere on or below that for men, so inequality is greater for women according to
all CF(γ ) indices, but the differences between the curves are negligible. The higher inequality among
women conclusion is also supported by the comparisons ofH curves: there is dual dominance, though
it should be noted that the H− curves largely coincide. The estimates of all nine inequality indices
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are larger for women than men but differences are not statistically significant from zero. Among the
largest differences are those registered by P2(2) and ANY(1,4), 10% and 8% respectively, but the test
t-statistics are only 1.7 and 1.9 respectively.
Overall, one cannot state with confidence that the life satisfaction distributions of New Zealand
men and women differ in 2004, which is a positive conclusion if the social goal is to eliminate gender
divides in well-being. Note also that life satisfaction questions provide an individual-based perspec-
tive that conventional income distribution analysis is unable to do because of the standard assumption
that income is equally distributed within families or households.
There appear to be some remarkable differences across age groups in life satisfaction but robust
conclusions about these differences are bedevilled by small sample sizes. The outstanding feature of
the subgroup frequency distributions is the extremely large fraction of individuals aged 60+ reporting
that they are completely satisfied (a score of 10), 36%, which is around twice the fraction for the other
two groups – 16% for individuals aged 30–59 and 17% for individuals aged 18–29. Related, themedian
life satisfaction score for the 60+ group is 9, but 8 for the other two groups, and the means are 8.3,
7.4, and 7.7, respectively. (The differences in means for the 60+ group and each of the other two age
groups are statistically significant; the difference in means for the two younger groups is not.) The
relatively high average for the 60+ group is robust to changes in scale: their distribution F-dominates
the distributions for each of the other two groups. The high rates of individuals aged 60+ group
at the top of the life satisfaction distribution is in contrast with their position in the distribution of
household income (on this, see e.g. Perry, 2018: Figures B1 and B2).
There are no S-dominance results, nor Generalized Lorenz or H dual dominance results. Esti-
mates of the nine inequality indices do not provide conclusive results either. On the one hand, this
is because the inequality ranking of the groups depends on the index: the 60+ group has the low-
est inequality according to the three CF(γ ) indices but the highest inequality according to ANY(1,1)
and P2(0.5). The various indices account for the very high number of completely satisfied individu-
als aged 60+ in different ways. On the other hand, the 95% confidence intervals for all the estimates
are extremely wide (especially for the 18–29 group with a sample size of only 111), and the intervals
overlap substantially. No cross-group inequality difference differs significantly from zero.
Overall, it appears that the prevalence of extremely high life satisfaction levels in New Zealand (in
2004) is much greater for individuals aged 60+ than for younger people, but robust conclusions about
inequality differences across age groups cannot be made because of small sample sizes.
7. Summary and conclusions
I have argued that we should compare distributions of ordinal data usingmethods appropriate to such
data, rather than applying methods developed for cardinal data as is commonly done. That the appli-
cation of cardinalmethods sometimes yields the same substantive conclusion is not a strong argument
against my injunction because there can also be situations in which different methods lead to differ-
ent findings and, in any case, there is now a well-developed toolbox for undertaking distributional
comparisons of subjective well-being data. As I have shown, easily-applicable tools are available to
‘show the data’ and to compare well-being levels and inequality using dominance checks and indices.
Areas for further research on aspects of the subjective well-being toolbox remain of course. One
example is the relationship between H curve dual dominance and rankings by Cowell-Flachaire
(2017) inequality indices. Another example is the development of appropriate methods for statistical
inference, accompanied by software, enabling practitioners to implement the methods routinely.
Better methods also need to be accompanied by better data. My empirical illustrations based
on WVS data have thrown up some intriguing results about how life satisfaction in New Zealand
compares with other countries, how it has changed over time, and differs by sex and age. These per-
spectives on the nation’s well-being differ in several ways from those provided when well-being is
measured using income. However, it is also the case that the small sample sizes available in the WVS
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substantially constrain our ability to conclude whether a finding is statistically significant in addition
to being substantively significant. This is particularly so for subgroup breakdowns.
Fortunately, there are larger sample sizes in New Zealand’s General Social Survey (GSS) – around
8,000 which is around eight times larger than New Zealand’s WVS sample sizes – with surveys car-
ried out in 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2018. TheGSS enables some additional important breakdowns
for groups such as Pakeha, Ma¯ori, and Pasifika, and by region of residence. Te Kupenga, a specialist
survey of Ma¯ori well-being undertaken in 2013, also enables detailed breakdowns but comparisons
with GSS data are constrained because the GSS used a 5-point life satisfaction scale in its 2008, 2010,
and 2012 rounds. Another promising development is the recent substantial expansion in the House-
hold Economic Survey’s sample size to around 20,000 households combined with the introduction
of additional well-being questions.
Access to the unit record data from these data sources should be improved in order to maximize
the returns to the large investments that they represent. At present, researchers based outside New
Zealand cannot access the confidential unit record files and New Zealand-based researchers can only
do so fromwithin Statistics New Zealand-approved datalabs. I support Statistics New Zealand’s goals
of preserving respondent confidentiality and privacy. Yet, at the same time, experience elsewhere
shows that it is possible to provide better data access while still meeting these goals. Given the priority
that New Zealand is placing on information about subjective well-being nowadays, it is important to
increase the amount of data analysis undertaken on the topic. Facilitating an increase in the pool of
analysts is one important way to do this.
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APPENDICES
A. Life satisfaction in New Zealand: comparisons of 1998, 2004, and 2011
B. Life satisfaction in New Zealand: comparisons of men and men, and of three age groups (18–29, 30–59,
60+ years)
The 5 figures in each appendix correspond with the 5 figures presented in the main text. All estimates are derived
from weighted WVS data.
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Figure A1. The distribution of life satisfaction in NZ: 1998, 2004, and 2011.
Notes: The median (and mode) is 8 for all 3 years. The means are 7.7 for 1998, 7.9 for 2004, and 7.6 for 2011.
Figure A2. Cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for life satisfaction, 1998, 2004, and 2004.
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Figure A3. Checks for dominance according to all CF(γ ) inequality indices using Generalized Lorenz curve comparisons of life
satisfaction ‘status’ distributions.
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Figure A4. Checks for life satisfaction H+ dominance (left) and H– dominance (right).
Figure A5. Indices of life satisfaction inequality and polarization.
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(a) Men and women  
(b) Age group 
Figure B1. The distribution of life satisfaction in NZ, by sex and age group. (a) Men and women. Notes: The median is 8 and the
mean is 7.9 for both men and women. (b) Age group. Notes: The median is 8 for individuals aged 18–29 or aged 30–59 years, and 9
for individuals aged 60+. The means are 7.7, 7.4, and 8.3, respectively.
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(a) Men and women  
(b) Age group 
Figure B2. Cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for life satisfaction, by subgroup. (a) Men and women. (b) Age group.
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(a) Men and women  
(b) Age group 
Figure B3. Checks for dominance according to all CF(γ ) inequality indices using Generalized Lorenz curve comparisons of life
satisfaction ‘status’ distributions. (a) Men and women. (b) Age group.
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(a) Men and women 
(b) Age group 
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Figure B4. Checks for life satisfaction H+ dominance (left) and H– dominance (right). (a) Men and women. (b) Age group.
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Figure B5.
